Bill C-11: Commentary Round-Up (12.22.11)

Selected commentary and information on Bill C-11 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

Bill C-11: Commentary Round-Up (11.11.11)

Selected commentary and information on Bill C-11 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

Bill C-11, TPMs, Private Use and Statutory Damages

UPDATED BELOW

The Montreal Gazette ran an editorial today regarding Bill C-11 (the Copyright Modernization Act) (The Gazette's View: Bringing copyright law into the 21st century), which contains a glaring factual error regarding statutory damages and technological protection measures (TPMs).  From the editorial [emphasis added]:

Less welcome, and the sticking point in previous attempts to pass this bill, is the blanket provision against breaking digital locks, even for purposes of personal use. This includes picking a lock on a DVD purchased overseas to watch at home, or transferring a purchased e-book to read to another personal device. The bill provides for $5,000 fines for even the smallest such violations.

This provision was apparently included as a result of heavy pressure from U.S. authorities and in the interest of maintaining cross-border trade and exemption from protectionist measures that would prevent Canadian firms from bidding on U.S. government procurement contracts. It is unlikely that there will be many prosecutions under this article as long as violations are committed in the privacy of people’s homes and not for any commercial purpose, but it is still a niggling restriction that caves in to the U.S. at the expense of the right of average Canadians to do what they wish to with their own property for their own enjoyment.

Bill C-11 contains no provision which would allow for the imposition of a $5,000 fine for the described activities, nor does it contain any provision which would allow for a court to impose statutory damages were a plaintiff to commence an action for the circumvention of a TPM in the circumstances described in the editorial.  The writers of the editorial seem to think that the statutory damages provisions of the revised Copyright Act would apply to "picking a lock on a DVD purchased overseas to watch at home, or transferring a purchased e-book to read to another personal device" - that conclusion is simply incorrect.

The proposed new Sections 41 and 41.1 would certainly make it an act of infringement to circumvent a TPM - but proposed Section 41.1(3) specifically states that a rightsholder cannot recover statutory damages from an individual who contravened that paragraph only for his or her own private purposes.  The new statutory damages regime would set an absolute maximum statutory damages liability of $5,000 (the number which seems to have caught the eye of the editorial writers) for non-commercial infringement - but proposed Section 41.1(3) says that the statutory damages mechanism does not apply at all to circumventions of TPMs which are done for private purposes. 

There are certainly remedies other than statutory damages which a rightsholder could seek against someone who circumvents a TPM in the circumstances contemplated in the editorial but, as the Gazette editorial notes (refreshingly, in the context of the copyright reform debates), as a practical matter, the chances of such claims being brought are vanishingly small.  Whatever other criticisms one might make of the TPM provisions proposed in Bill C-11, exposing individuals to $5,000 of statutory damages liability for "even the smallest of such violations" is not a possibility.

A short note about terminology: the Gazette editorial uses the word "fine" to describe the non-existent $5,000 "penalty" for which they think an individual could be liable.  A "fine" is something imposed upon a wrongdoer by a state authority (Black's Law Dictionary: "a pecuniary punishment or penalty imposed by lawful tribunal upon person convicted of crime or misdemeanor").  Statutory damages are not "fines" - they are "damages", claimable only by a private plaintiff in a civil court proceeding.  The copyright reform debates often get mired in terminological debates (is copyright infringement theft?), because words matter - describing statutory damages as "fines" is inaccurate and inflammatory.  (The proposed revisions to the Copyright Act do contemplate fines for circumventing TPMs (in proposed Section 42(3.1), but those would only be available where the circumvention is done for commercial purposes.)

UPDATE (10.05.11): The Gazette editorial was published on October 1, 2011, not October 5, 2011, as I indicated in the first line of this post.  Barry Sookman, on October 3, 2011, addressed the inaccuracy of the Gazette's statements in Some observations on Bill C-11: The Copyright Modernization Act.

Bill C-11: Commentary Round-Up (10.03.11)

Selected commentary on Bill C-11 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

Let's Try This Again: Canadian Government Tables Bill C-11 (Copyright Modernization Act)

On September 29, 2011, the Canadian government tabled Bill C-11 (the Copyright Modernization Act), which is effectively a re-introduction of Bill C-32 which died with the dissolution of Parliament in March 2011 ahead of the federal election in May 2011.  As with Bill C-32, we're going to do our best here at the Signal to offer coverage of the debates and progress surrounding this new effort at copyright reform.  (Our coverage of Bill C-32 is archived here.)

Already, as expected, Bill C-32 has prompted a torrent (get it?) of commentary and information.  Some of the more notable:

For what's it's worth, my own views of Bill C-11 remain remarkably like my views of Bill C-32: there is much which is worthwhile in the bill, and there are elements which deserve modification.  On the larger issue of how Canada tackles copyright reform, I think I covered it in an op-ed which was published in the January 24, 2011 edition of the Hill Times, which I reproduce here (you'll have to excuse the painfully ungainly last sentence):

Copyright is contentious, in some cases intractably so, but the way in which we approach copyright reform is making matters worse.

As Sara Bannerman notes in her essay in From "Radical Extremism" to "Balanced Copyright": Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda, edited by Michael Geist, in 1923 copyright was referred to as “the most controversial subject that has ever been before the Parliament of Canada” – so the fact that that copyright reform generates heated, sometimes vicious, rhetoric is nothing new. Unfortunately, the methods we use to reform copyright are likewise not new, and so a cycle of failed efforts at reform perpetuates itself. Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act), currently before legislative committee, represents the third attempt in the last ten years to achieve comprehensive reform – and that is precisely the problem.

Recent copyright reform efforts, like Bill C-60, Bill C-61 and particularly the current Bill C-32, read as if they are striving to solve every conceivable copyright concern in one fell swoop. To nobody’s surprise, they fail to achieve that goal. Bill C-32 covers at least thirteen different major aspects of the copyright regime – from photography to internet service provider liability to so-called “format shifting” – any one of which is fertile enough ground for virtually ceaseless lobbying, debate and fine-tuning. Other than the fact that they all fall under the general heading of “copyright”, there is little which binds the various matter together. Copyright, and those Canadians who are affected by it, would be far better served if Parliament avoided efforts at omnibus legislative reform and opted instead for piece-meal “fixes” of discrete problems.

As an example, why should updating our legislation to allow for the ability to record and watch a television program without the prospect of incurring liability for copyright infringement (something which has been an issue since the advent of the VCR a generation ago) be contingent on also revising the scope of various educational institution exceptions? It would of course be wonderful if we could “solve” all the outstanding copyright problems at once, but yoking multiple individual problems together, particularly the much-more controversial with the much-less controversial, merely jeopardizes any advancement on any front. Issues on which there is relatively broad consensus (such as format- and time-shifting) get packaged with issues which seem set to dissolve into wars of attrition (such as technological protection measures or “digital locks”).

And, of course, the comprehensive reform approach virtually inevitably overlooks a few issues of concern. The matter of Crown copyright remains unaddressed by Bill C-32, as does the open question of the identity of the “author” of a motion picture. These may be minor affairs in the grand sweep of the copyright debate, but the adoption of a “once per decade” approach to copyright reform means that live issues overlooked now will not be addressed for many years. Brute political calculus rules the copyright reform agenda – instead of legislating to get efficient and practical reforms, we get legislation which seeks to give just enough marginal benefit to every possible stakeholder that they are willing to overlook the negative aspects of other parts of the bill.

Omnibus legislation poses at least two dangers. First, given a surplus of information and deficits of time and attention, not all elements of the legislation may receive the scrutiny which is warranted, allowing unanticipated problems or infelicities of drafting to “sneak through”; second, good elements can be outweighed or “crowded out” because of bad elements. Positive amendments may be lost because the negative amendments are so deleterious that we cannot in good conscience pass the legislation simply in order to obtain the good parts.

We would be better served by discrete, targeted amendments to the Copyright Act, introduced in a timely fashion and which can each be assessed on their own merits. Repeated failed attempts at omnibus amendments serve the interests of few, except lobbyists and lawyers. Just as the music industry has seen fit to “unbundle” its offerings, moving from selling entire albums to individual tracks, so too should copyright reform be approached in a way which allows for incremental improvements.Otherwise we remain the unwitting victims of an “all or nothing” approach which serves the interests of none.

(The Final) Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act) died with the prorogation of the 40th Canadian Parliament on March 26, 2011.  My own views on the bill were (and remain) largely irrelevant, but I will be discussing what would have changed had the bill been passed into law (and what the lack of passage means for practitioners) at the Law Society of Upper Canada's 2011 Entertainment & Media Law Symposium, along with my co-panelists Erin Finlay and Giuseppina D'Agostino.  In light of the death of Bill C-32, this, final, commentary round-up offers for consideration some selected materials which have made their way into my RSS feeds over the last few weeks:

Comics and Copyright

The twelve-year old me would be incredibly disappointed that my practice does not consist solely of cases which involve the intersection of comic books and copyright law.  A few recent items of worthy of note:

  • Evil Twin Comics have published the Comic Book Comics series, which tells "the inspiring, infuriating, and utterly insane story of the American comic book industry" - including a recounting, in the words of Eriq Gardner at THR, Esq., "such disputes as whether the Captain Marvel character was an infringement on the Superman character, the legendary legal battle over the control of Howard the Duck, the legal mystery surrounding the creation of Josie and the Pussycats, and Jack Kirby's battles with Marvel over stolen artwork"
  • on a topic related to my post and short article from last year (Copyright and the King), Vincent James Scipior has written "Spider-Man and His Amazing Friends: Trapped in the Tangled Web of the Termination Provisions" (forthcoming in the Wisconsin Law Review, but available now for download from SSRN) - Scipior's article talks about copyright termination claims under US law and concludes, as I did with respect to the reversionary interest clause in Canada's own Copyright Act, that such claims/interests "deprive companies of all certainty in their copyright ownership" (hat tip: Media Law Prof Blog)
  • Betty Boop wasn't a comic book character (she was a cartoon character), but that's close enough for our purposes - the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided that the family of the creator of the Boop character could not claim either copyright or trade-mark rights in the character; the decision is noteworthy because the court was emphatic that it would not allow a rights owner to assert a successful trade-mark claim where the effect of such successful claim would be to, in effect, make an end-run around copyright law and result in a virtually perpetual assertion of rights
  • Joshua L. Simmons wrote an interesting rumination on "Catwoman or the Kingpin: Potential Reasons Comic Book Publishers Do Not Enforce Their Copyrights Against Comic Book Infringer" (33 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 267 (2010) - available for download from SSRN here)

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

Selected materials for consideration about Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

Selected materials for consideration about Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

US 9th Circuit: Promotional CDs Not Subject to Restrictions on Sale (and Its Canadian Relevance)

In UMG Recordings, Inc. v Troy Augusto, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confirmed that promotional CDs which are distributed by record companies are not subject to restrictions on their sale (hat tip: Barry Werbin). As the court noted, many record companies distribute music CDs to various individuals or organizations (such as music critics and radio stations) in an attempt to develop marketing buzz.  The CDs are often marked with phrases such as "Promotional Use Only - Not for Sale", or even bear printed statements such as:

"This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the intended recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable under federal and state laws."

Universal Music Group was chagrined to find that Mr. Augusto was obtaining promotional CDs and selling them on eBay - and sued Augusto for copyright infringement (on the basis that Augusto had infringed on UMG's exclusive right to distribute the CDs).  Augusto, in defence, raised the US "first sale" doctrine (found in Section 109(a) of the US Copyright Act, which states that "the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord" (Section 109(b) nonetheless prohibits the "rental, lease, or lending" of the CD).  UMG argued that there had never been a "sale" of the CDs, only a license on particular terms - terms which were breached by Augusto's subsequent sales on eBay.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no license had been created: there did not need to be a "sale" of the CD in order to trigger the "first sale" doctrine, only a transfer of title - and title had been transferred by the fact that the CDs were mailed out without any prior agreement (or even discussion) with the recipient as to how the CDs were to be handled.  Simply printing words on the CDs was not sufficient to create a license or to otherwise restrict the ability of the recipient to deal with the CDs.  The court also held that, in the alternative, Augusto was able to rely on the provisions of the Unordered Merchandise Act, which results in the CDs effectively being treated as "gifts" and confers on recipients the right to dispose of the merchandise as they see fit.

(Although not much attention was paid to the matter, the Ninth Circuit distinguished software licenses mostly on the basis that software owners are able to "control" what software users/licensees are able to do with their software - and there seems to be an implicit recognition that software users need to affirmatively "accept" a software license and that the software itself can impose restrictions on what users are able to do with the software (such as the use of copy controls).  However, while that analysis might work for "click-wrap" licenses, it is unclear whether it would work for "shrink-wrap" licenses.)

Canadian copyright law does not enjoy the benefit of a codified "first sale" doctrine, though there is some limited recognition of the concept of "exhaustion", which would be functionally equivalent (see previous Signal discussion about the "first sale" doctrine).  Pascale Chapdelaine, in an IPilogue post we previously highlighted, offers some detailed thoughts about Canadian recognition of a first sale doctrine:

The doctrine of first sale finds its roots in the English common law rule against restraints on alienation of property. In effect, it modulates two competing property interests in the copyrighted work, e.g. the intangible exclusive rights of the copyright holder in the copyrighted work and the property rights in the tangible embodiment of this work by the purchaser. One limits the rights of the other and vice versa (although very asymmetrically, as the exclusive rights conferred by copyright impose greater limitations on copy ownership than the reverse).  First sale is also consistent with the normative values of freedom and autonomy that underlie property including chattels, as well as the instrumental goals of copyright to encourage the creation and dissemination of copyrighted works, when viewed from a broader perspective that also encompasses users of copyrighted works.

Pascale notes that Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act) incorporates references to the first sale/exhaustion doctrine.  Bill C-32 would, if passed in its current form, appear to result in Canadian law being consistent with the decision in UMG v Augusto.  Clauses 4, 9 and 11 of Bill C-32 create what is colloquially referred to as a "making available" right - similar to the exclusive right to distribute a work created by Section 106(3) of the US Copyright Act.  Clause 4 of Bill C-32 would add a new subclause (j) to Section 3(1) of the Copyright Act (Canada), which would result in the section reading as follows [emphasis added]:

3.(1) For the purposes of this Act, “copyright”, in relation to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public or, if the work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part thereof, and includes the sole right...

(j) in the case of a work that is in the form of a tangible object, to sell or otherwise transfer ownership of the tangible object, as long as that ownership has never previously been transferred in or outside Canada with the authorization of the copyright owner,

Clause 11 of Bill C-32 would modify Section 18 of the Copyright Act (Canada) by adding a new Section 1.1 reading as follows:

(1.1) ... a sound recording maker’s copyright in the sound recording also includes the sole right to do the following acts in relation to the sound recording or any substantial part of it and to authorize any of those acts: ...

(b) if it is in the form of a tangible object, to sell or otherwise transfer ownership of the tangible object, as long as that ownership has never previously been transferred in or outside Canada with the authorization of the owner of the copyright in the sound recording.

That would have the effect of making the decision of a Canadian court faced with facts similar to those in Augusto almost certainly the same as the Ninth Circuit's decision (at least with respect to copyright issues - I'll leave commentary on whether Canada has anything similar to the Unordered Merchandise Act to someone else).  The new Section 3(1)(j) and 18(1.1) would give record companies the exclusive right to transfer ownership of the tangible object on which a sound recording was embodied - in other words, the physical CD.  But, they would enjoy that right only if ownership had never previously been transferred with the authorization of the record company.  Note that the language does not require a "sale" - only a "transfer of ownership".  Thus, just as the Ninth Circuit held, a Canadian court would likely determine that ownership of the CD had been transferred when the record company mailed out the promo CDs, and that the recipient of the CD, and anyone to whom they transferred the CD, would be free in turn to sell or transfer the CD. 

Of course, the analysis in the preceding two paragraphs depends on Bill C-32 being passed with the relevant language intact.  In the absence of Bill C-32 being passed, Canadian copyright owners do not enjoy an express "making available" right, so Canadian record companies would appear to be in an even less enviable position than their US counterparts when trying to prevent unauthorized sales of promotional CDs.  The possible arguments they could raise would be limited to a copyright infringement action due to a breach of a license term, or a straightforward breach of contract case; without having done any research on the matter, I'm not sure I can see why Canadian courts would be any more receptive to such arguments than the Ninth Circuit was.  Possibly, if the album or single in question had not yet been made publicly available for sale, the record companies could argue that the work on the CD was "unpublished" and that selling a promotional CD was an infringement of their right to "publish" the work - but surely that would be a very time-limited prospect.  Presumably, then, the brisk trade in promo CDs on online auction sites and in used record stores will continue unimpeded on both sides of the border.

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

Selected materials for consideration about Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

Selected materials for consideration about Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

Selected materials for consideration about Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

Bill C-32 Commentary: Parts of Bill C-32 Are Complex - And That's Okay

The good folks at The Hill Times were nice enough to publish an op-ed of mine about Bill C-32 earlier this week.  The core of the argument is this: because of the competing nature of the interests which it seeks to balance, some parts of copyright law are inevitably going to be complicated - and complexity which leads to certainty is better than a quixotic attempt at "simplicity" which will only lead to disputes and further litigation.  The full text of the op-ed is available after the jump, below.

Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act) and the changes it will make to Canadian copyright laws may be described as many things – “simple” is not one of them.  That, however, is not necessarily a criticism of the Bill.  Parts of Bill C-32 are complex – and that’s a good thing.  When it comes to copyright, sometimes complex is better than than simple – because what looks like “simplicity” is really just a recipe for endless litigation.

 

There are two kinds of complexity: complexity which produces an unclear result and complexity which produces a clear result.  The former is to be avoided, while the latter is, when the situation calls for it, not to be feared and even to be sought after.  Copyright law is becoming irreducibly complex because of a number of factors, primarily the relentless advance of digital technology and the resulting ability of individuals to use copyrighted works in ways previously unimagined.  Such changes exert pressure on the copyright regime because they increase tension at the interfaces of rights, owners and users.

 

We should distinguish complexity from confusion – something which is complex can actually avoid confusion and promote greater clarity.  Copyright law offers many examples of this: Part VIII of the Copyright Act (which sets out the “private copying levy” for blank audio recording media) is complicated but leads to a clear result – while the provisions are spread out over ten relatively detailed sections of the Act there is comparatively little uncertainty as to the application and administration of the levy.  Compare that to the “fair dealing” provisions of the Copyright Act, which take up three short sections but have spawned a library’s worth of court decisions and commentary – and even lawyers will hedge on a definitive answer about how to apply “fair dealing” in many circumstances.  The Documentary Organization of Canada (DOC) recently tried to provide its members with “simple language” guidelines on how to navigate “fair dealing” law.  The result was a twenty-page document with more than eighty footnotes – and the fair dealing sections of the Copyright Act total less than 150 words.  Apparent simplicity results not in clarity, but in virtually endless confusion.  This is hardly DOC’s fault – it’s just that copyright is complicated. 

 

Copyright law is complicated because it is a mechanism which seeks to accomplish a number of inherently competing goals: providing incentives and rewards to creators, ensuring that citizens have a robust ability to make use of creative works, and seeking clarity in a world of rapidly changing technology.

 

While the Copyright Act is replete with baroque curlicues which serve little apparent purpose and whose elimination would serve to make Canadian copyright law more comprehensible, it is not the case that every aspect of copyright law needs to be simple.  Counter-intuitively, complexity in copyright law is not a bad thing, but in some cases is a goal to strive towards – if, that is, the complexity results in certainty.  Detailed approaches to matters such as fair dealing or exceptions to infringement can be more productive than open-ended or principles-based approaches because a detailed approach can facilitate definitive answers.  Where no clear answer is available, that is a recipe for confusion and, eventually, litigation.  Over-simplification in the legislation will merely lead to confusion and arguments in court – which would fatten the wallets of lawyers, but leave no one else any farther ahead.

 

If we have a copyright law which says “Do whatever is fair”, it will be simple but incomprehensible and open to dispute – and a lot of lawyers are going to get rich.  If instead we have a law which says “Do whatever is fair, and when we say ‘fair’ we mean you have to satisfy the following ten-point test…”, it will be more complicated, but ultimately will be more certain and fewer disputes are likely to arise. 

 

When complexity is unnecessary to accomplish a goal, then the complexity is superfluous and should be jettisoned.  But when complexity is simply a reflection of the complex nature of the underlying issues being addressed, then it should not be avoided in a misguided attempt to simplify beyond the point of utility.  Sometimes complex issues require complex answers – copyright reform is one of those times.

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

Selected materials for consideration about Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

The Challenge of the Unlocatable Copyright Owner - Now Empirically Verified

Further to our earlier post (The Challenge of the Unlocatable Copyright Owner), Jeremy de Beer and Mario Bouchard have written a very interesting study entitled Canada's "Orphan Works" Regime: Unlocatable Copyright Owners and the Copyright Board.  In addition to providing an excellent description of the existing "orphan works" licensing process, there is a detailed statistical analysis done on the efficiency of that process.

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

As Bill C-32 moves into the critical committee stage, commentary on the topic has been piling up at a frenzied pace.  Some selected materials for perusal:

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

More selected Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act)-related commentary for perusal:

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

A plethora of selected Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act)-related commentary from the past few weeks for perusal:

Bill C-32: Commentary Round-up

The past week has seen a number of different entries in the ongoing debates regarding Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act):

Also of particular interest is the availability of the Library of Parliament's Legislative Summary of Bill C-32

On an anticipatory note, Irwin Law will in October be publishing From "Radical Extremism" to" Balanced Copyright": Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda.

Bill C-32: Summer Commentary Round-up

In light of the expectation that copyright reform, and in particular Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act), will be a priority issue for Parliament this fall and winter, I thought it might be useful to collect some of the notable commentary on the Bill since our last round-up.

As a reminder, here at the Signal we're going to do our best over the next few months to keep tabs on developments and commentary, from a variety of perspectives, surrounding Bill C-32, so we invite readers to check back often (clicking the "Bill C-32" tag below will bring you to an index of all posts on the Signal about the topic).

Previews of Music as Fair Dealing (Threedux)

A further development (see our earlier posts on the topic: Previews of Music as Fair Dealing and Previews of Music as Fair Dealing (Redux)) in the SOCAN v Bell Canada, et al case - where the Federal Court of Appeal recently held that "previews" of songs offered by online music services constituted "fair dealing" for the purposes of research.  SOCAN has filed a motion for leave to appeal the Federal Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.  SOCAN's motion can be found here (hat tip: Sookman).  The Memorandum of Argument begins on page 104 of 133.

SOCAN's primary argument is subtle, one which trades on the enriching of the fair dealing defence prompted by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in CCH v LSUC (2004 SCC 13).  In essence, the argument is premised on the notion that a purposive approach to interpreting fair dealing necessarily involves a taking a highly fragmented approach to that interpretive exercise; in short, the argument seems to be, if you want to understand whether a particular activity constitutes "fair dealing" you must investigate that activity with full immersion in its factual circumstances - and if you do that, then the notion that an online preview constitutes "research" in the sense that the Copyright Act is intended to facilitate falls apart.  Put a different way, the argument is that the finding in CCH arose in very particular circumstances, which don't translate to the online exploitation of music.   From paragraphs 7-9 of the Memorandum of Argument:

The Applicant submits that in finding that the actions of the Respondents constitute fair dealing, the Court below has created a very significant and unwarranted expansion in the scope of the defence. This expansion disrupts the balance between creators and users that the Act was intended to strike and results in the complete removal of the Applicant’s rights over a significant use of its music repertoire on the Internet in a manner that is incompatible with the object, spirit and purpose of the Act.

The defence of fair dealing is intended to further the central purpose of copyright law, that is, to strike a balance between the public interest in the creation and dissemination of creative works and the interest of creators in obtaining a just reward for their efforts. The Act imposes two conditions on the availability of the fair dealing defence: the dealing must be for an allowable purpose as enumerated by the Act and the dealing must be, in fact, fair. The allowable purposes listed in section 29 of the Act are “research and private study.” In light of the purpose of the Act, the use of music previews by the Respondents cannot be considered either research or private study and the volume of previews transmitted by the Respondents is too large to be considered fair.

The decisions below imperil the balance between protecting the interest of creators and promoting the development of creative works by expanding the definition of the term “research” to include activities that do not encourage the creation and dissemination of new works and by failing to consider the amount of the dealing in the aggregate.

Because any eventual Supreme Court decision in this case would be one of the first opportunities for the Court to authoritatively describe the contours of fair dealing following CCH v LSUC, whether Court agrees to hear the appeal, almost as much as the decision itself, will be important.

Previews of Music as Fair Dealing (Redux)

Further to this earlier post about the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, et al., 2010 FCA 123, which held that an online "preview" of a music track constitute "fair dealing" for purposes of research, Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed and Yonatan Rozenszajn have written a nice little summary of the decision over at the charmingly-named JIPLP (otherwise known as the "weblog of the Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice").  As Crowne-Mohammed and Rozanszajn note,

Given the nature of the ‘research’ involved in users listening to the 30-second clips or previews of songs online, the court felt that research be given its primary and ordinary meaning, this being the use of previews to help consumers in their search for a particular song as to ensure its authenticity and quality before purchasing it. In this context, ‘research’ included consumer research.

The court then examined whether a 30-second preview, or less, was fair. The Federal Court of Appeal agreed with the Copyright Board in holding that the amount of the dealing is presumptively fair, given the length of the complete work.

Bill C-32: Photographers and Performers

Nathan Fan, writing at IPilogue, looks at the impact that Bill C-32 (the Copyright Modernization Act) would have on the copyrights of photographers and performers:

The Copyright Modernization Act seeks to eliminate the distinction between photographs and other works by removing section 13(2), putting photographers back on equal footing with other authors (see Bill C-32 section 7).

The Bill also completely removes section 10, which was also an exception to the authorship and term of protection for photographs (see Bill C-32 section 6). ... The repeal of section 10 in its entirety again attempts to equalize the rights of photographers with other authors.

... Bill C-32 also seeks to bring performer rights up to par with other creators by implementing the 1997 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) and WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT). Section 10 of Bill C-32 proposes to extend moral rights to performers for live aural performances or performances fixed in a sound recording and for the same duration as the copyright term, as required by Article 5 of the WPPT.

...Section 9 of Bill C-32 amends section 15 of the current Act to provide performers the exclusive right in digital distribution (making available to the public by telecommunication) of performances in sound recordings as well as the exclusive right to first sale or transfer of tangible copies of such sound recordings. Section 11 of the Bill also extends these rights to the makers of such sound recordings.

 

 As Nathan points out, the changes to the provisions affecting photographers and performers have attracted comparatively little attention in the wake of Bill C-32's introduction - but as his post demonstrates, the proposed changes are quite consequential for both sets of creators.

Bill C-32: Second and Third Weeks Commentary Round-up

A busy couple of weeks (including the ever-eventful Banff World Television and nextMEDIA extravaganza)  has meant that the Signal has fallen behind in keeping track of the commentary occasioned by the release of Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act).  That being said, here are links to items we thought worth drawing attention to from the last ten days:

As a reminder, here at the Signal we're going to do our best over the next few months to keep tabs on developments and commentary, from a variety of perspectives, surrounding Bill C-32, so we invite readers to check back often (clicking the "Bill C-32" tag below will bring you to an index of all posts on the Signal about the topic).

Bill C-32: First Week Commentary Round-up

As anticipated, the release of Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act) has generated an enormous amount of commentary - herewith, some of the material I thought it worth drawing attention to:

Bill C-32: A Practical Solution on Digital Locks?

One of the more contentious elements of Bill C-32 (The Copyright Modernization Act) is the introduction of provisions addressing "digital locks" or "technological protection measures" (found in Sections 47 and 48 of the Bill, which would create new Sections 41 and 42 of the Copyright Act).  Critics of the digital locks provisions decry them in the following terms (let's use Michael Geist's comments as representative):

All these attempts at balance should be welcomed, yet they are undermined by the no-compromise position on digital locks.

The foundational principle of the new bill is that anytime a digital lock is used, it trumps virtually all other rights. This means that both the existing fair dealing rights and Bill C-32’s new rights all cease to function effectively so long as the rights holder places a digital lock on their content or device.

I want to contest the notion that the current draft of Bill C-32 represents a "no compromise position".  Given that we've only had the text of the Bill for a few hours, this is by necessity going to be a preliminary assessment.

In practical terms, the digital lock provisions enable a copyright to place a "lock" on their content which control access to that content and acts to prohibit certain reproductions - so, for example, the distributor of a movie on Blu-ray could place a digital lock on the Blu-ray which prevented the purchaser of that disc from copying the content of the disc onto the hard drive of the purchaser's desktop computer.  The purchaser might say they wanted to make the copy solely for purposes of creating a back-up, in case the original disc was lost.  The distributor would respond by saying that they don't want to run the risk that the purchaser is going to upload the movie onto a file-sharing site, thereby allowing other users to download the movie for free.  But, the purchaser might respond, Bill C-32 specifically allows me to create back-up copies (see Section 22 of the Bill, which creates a new Section 29.22 of the Act).  Tough, the distributor would respond: the Bill makes it clear that "breaking" a digital lock is infringement, and that doesn't change just because the lock is being "broken" in order to facilitate what would otherwise be a non-infringing use.  Hence, as Geist puts it, "anytime a digital lock is used, it trumps virtually all other rights".

As a legal matter, Geist is correct.  But this Bill needs to be assessed not just as a theoretical matter, but as a practical one.  And if we drill down a bit further into the proposed legislation, what we see is that the government has, as in so many other areas in this Bill, crafted what seems to be a rather elegant solution: the statutory damages provisions have been altered to the point where it disincentivizes a rightsholder from bringing an infringement action for infringing activity which is for private use.  The practical result?  "Breaking" a digital lock is copyright infringement, but is no more likely to result in a lawsuit against your average "private" infringer than they were likely to be sued for recording TV shows on their PVR over the past few years.

Here's the analysis: Section 46 of the Bill modifies the statutory damages provisions (Section 38.1 of the Act) to draw a distinction between infringement for commercial purposes (where damages can range from $500 to $20,000 for each work infringed) and infringements for non-commercial purposes (where damages can range from $100 to $5,000 for all works infringed).  So right off the top we've made it less punitive for "private" infringers.  The Bill then goes to mandate that courts, in the case of "private" infringers, consider the need for damages awards to be proportionate and take account of any hardship the damages might impose.

All of which is nice, but largely irrelevant (though indicative of the trend), because, even more importantly, what will become Section 41.1(3) of the revised Act provides that statutory damages are not available to an owner who sues an individual for "breaking" a digital lock when that breaking was done only for private purposes - which means, consistent with prior jurisprudence on copyright damages, damages are calculated to put a rightsholder in the position they would have occupied but for the infringement.  And in the case of an infringement for private use (such as the back-up copy illustration used above), those damages are likely to be negligible.  Absent the prospect of statutory damages, the likelihood of a rightsholder bringing an action for enforcement is radically reduced, since they'd be forced to expend enormous amounts of money to recover virtually nothing.

Thus, the proposed language seems to navigate between the two positions: it allows rightsholders to say that their digital locks are secure and claim a moral victory by describing the breaking of a digital lock as infringement, but then accords private infringers some comfort that the prospect of actually being sued is fairly minimal (after all, in all the years prior to the introduction of Bill C-32, when the full weight of statutory damages was available to rightsholders, how many lawsuits have been brought in Canada by rightsholders against people who were format-shifting or time-shifting their entertainment product?).  It's not a perfect solution, but life rarely admits of those.

The foregoing could be criticized on the basis that it is hopelessly naive to think that rightsholders will not sue - look south of the border and you'll find plenty of examples.  But admitting that involves ignoring a few things: the very different litigation cultures which obtain in Canada and the United States; the fact that the new Bill eliminates the prospect of statutory damages for "private" digital lock infringers but the lawsuits which have been criticized in the US are predicated on the availability of those very statutory damages; and the fact that mass lawsuits, as an empirical matter, simply haven't been brought in Canada to date (the fate of the initial attempt represented by the BMG v John Doe (2004 FC 488) case is illustrative).

In short, with respect to digital locks, it seems that Bill C-32, in its practical details, represents a compromise (imperfect as all such compromises necessarily are) - and likely one that all interested stakeholders can live with.

Bill C-32 - Full Text Available Online

The full text of Bill C-32 as it will be presented to Parliament for first reading is now available online.

Canada's Revised Copyright Regime: Bill C-32 Detailed

The Canadian government today announced the details of what will become Bill C-32: the Copyright Modernization Act (the text of the Bill is not yet available online) - the opening act of what is certain to be a contentious debate which will unfurl over the next few months.  Jason Magder provides coverage ("New copyright bill introduced") as does Steven Chase ("Tories unveil tougher copyright bill").  Some highlights from Magder's coverage in the Montreal Gazette:

It will be easier for recording companies and film studios to go after those who share files illegally, if a new copyright law introduced in the House of Commons Wednesday is passed.

The new law would require Internet service providers to notify their users if they receive a notice that a copyright has been infringed upon. The ISPs would then be required to hold on to the personal information of the infringing member, to turn it over if a court orders them to do so. Under the current law, ISPs only notify copyright infringers on a voluntary basis.

... Among other changes, the law legitimizes activities that most Canadians already do, such as transferring music from a legally purchased CD to an MP3 player, or recording a television show, which goes against current copyright rules, universally seen as outdated and last updated in 1997.

The legislation, however, makes it illegal to circumvent digital locks, even for personal or educational purposes.

And from Chase's coverage in the Globe and Mail:

The new bill aims to soften the blows of changes for consumers by legitimizing a lot of commonplace but grey-area activities such as home taping of TV or copying CDs to other devices or for backup purposes. It would legalize personal recording of TV, radio and Internet programs for later viewing or listening – as long as this is not done to create a permanent library of duplicated work. It would also okay the practice of copying already-purchased music, film or other electronic works to other playback devices such as MP3 players – or for backup purposes.

In what might be called the YouTube exemption: Canadians will be also free to create video “mashups” that borrow from commercial works for posting online.

Preliminary reaction from around the internet includes Michael Geist's impressively detailed consideration ("The Canadian Copyright Bill: Flawed But Fixable"), which ends with this:

...the initial reaction depends on whether you are a glass half full or glass half empty person.  For the glass half-full, the compromise positions on fair dealing, the new exceptions, and statutory damages are not bad - not perfect - but better than C-61.  For the glass half-empty, the digital lock provisions are almost identical to C-61 and stand as among the most anti-consumer copyright provisions in Canadian history.

Personally, I'm a glass half-full kind of guy (at least when it comes to copyright reform) and, without having seen the text of the bill, would strike a position even more positive than Geist's: most legislation, and particularly copyright legislation, ends up being an ungainly compromise among the interests of various stakeholders, so a bill which attempts to address a broad range of concerns and take account of a broad range of interests is inevitably going to contain elements that are problematic for whoever is assessing it.  It seems that there are many positive elements to this bill, and it will be interesting to see what survives and changes through the committee process in Parliament.

Here at the Signal we're going to do our best over the next few months to keep tabs on developments and commentary, from a variety of perspectives, surrounding Bill C-32, so we invite readers to check back often (clicking the "Bill C-32" tag below will bring you to an index of all posts on the Signal about the topic).

UPDATE: The CBC has a piece with reactions from a variety of stakeholders ("Copyright bill would outlaw breaking digital locks").

 UPDATE: The Entertainment Software Association of Canada "welcomes strong action on copyright".

UPDATE: ACTRA describes the bill as "a real blow to artists".

UPDATE: Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA) and Canadian Independent Music Association (CIMA) "thank the government for taking this step to protect the right of artists and other rights holders to earn a living from their work".

The Challenge of the Unlocatable Copyright Owner

What to do when you stumble across a copyrighted work (eg, a film clip, a lengthy excerpt from a book, a portion of a song, a photograph, etc.) which you want to incorporate into anew work which you are creating (such a film or book or multimedia project)?  Jeremy Phillips, posting at the 1709 Copyright Blog, notes that the UK's Intellectual Property Office has published its answer to the question: How do I locate a copyright owner if I want to use the work?  The answer provides various bits of advice on how to go about identifying who the owner of copyright is and then actually tracking them down in order to request permission.

All of which is well and good, but what happens when the owner is difficult or impossible to find?  In the UK, the advice of the Intellectual Property Office is as follows:

... if you are having difficulty locating a right holder, you should keep good records of your efforts. (This will help to show that you have been trying to act in good faith.) If you are unsuccessful in tracing the right holder, and still wish to proceed with your project, you should do so with caution. You may wish to set aside an appropriate fee for the use of the work in a special bank account, and, when you use the work, apply a statement indicating that you have tried to trace the right holder, but have failed to do so, and then invite any legitimate right holder to contact you. You should bear in mind that should the right owner appear, they may consider suing you for infringement of their rights, and in such a case you would want to show the right holder, and perhaps the courts, that you have acted in good faith and have made reasonable efforts to try to track down the right holder.

Helpful as far as it goes, but when the advice ends with "well, if you get sued, this might be helpful", perhaps it leaves something to be desired...

Here in Canada, that answer can be supplemented, as outlined in this helpful brochure published by the Copyright Board of Canada: Unlocatable Copyright Owners.  As the brochure notes, if a person desires to use a published copyrighted work (and the contemplated use does not fall within one of the exceptions to infringement contained in the Copyright Act or does not constitute fair dealing) and they have "made every reasonable effort to find the copyright owner" but been unsuccessful, then under Section 77 of the Copyright Act (Canada), an application can be made to the Copyright Board of Canada for a license.  The brochure contains useful tips on preparing an application for a license.

Previews of Music as Fair Dealing

POST UPDATED

This post is somewhat curious to write - it is about a decision of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal which, at the moment, appears not to be available online, thus limiting discussion of the appeal to what has been reported in other blogs and news outlets.  Here is what we know at this time (this post will be updated when the full decision is made publicly available - UPDATE May 25, 2010: the text of the decision is available here):

  • Barry Sookman has reported that at some point last week the Federal Court of Appeal issued a decision in the ongoing judicial review of the Copyright Board of Canada's decision regarding SOCAN's Tariff 22.A - according to Sookman, the Court of Appeal has, confirming the decision of the Copyright Board, ruled that offering an online "preview" of a song in order to enable a consumer to decide whether to purchase that song constitutes an example of "fair dealing" for research purposes, and hence no public performance royalty is payable to SOCAN in connection with that preview
  • The Copyright Board of Canada's original decision (released on October 18, 2007) which was the subject of the appeal to the Federal Court, is available here.  The Board's conclusion regarding "previews" begins at page 31 of the .pdf.
  • Michael Geist, in his post discussing the FCA decision, evidently has access to a copy of the decision (where does he get those wonderful toys?), and reproduces a passage from the decision which indicates that the FCA has vigorously adopted the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in the CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13 that the "fair dealing" provisions in the Copyright Act should be given a liberal and purposive interpretation

As Geist notes, the implications of the decision are "very significant".  In declining to accord the word "research" a restricted interpretation (as Sookman notes, "SOCAN had argued before the Court that the term “research” applied to activities involving investigation, systematic research, critical analysis, scientific inquiry and factual discoveries arising and being carried out in a formal setting"), the FCA has affirmed that, in Geist's words, "the door is open to creative uses of the fair dealing provision in Canada consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's view of a copyright balance between user rights and creator rights".

What may be most significant about the decision is that it may work to undercut the arguments of those (including this writer) who have argued in the past that a "fair use" approach to user's rights may be more beneficial than the "fair dealing" mechanism currently found in Canadian copyright law.  ("Fair dealing" provides for a prescribed and limited set of acceptable uses (research, private study, criticism or review and news reporting) which fall outside the ambit of a copyright owner's exclusive rights, while "fair use" is an American concept which allows for an open-ended assessment of the purposes, and so is not limited to the five acceptable purposes found in Canadian law.)  

Counter-intuitively, with respect to online "previews" of music, "fair dealing" has proved to be more accommodating than "fair use" - as Sookman notes, in the US decisions on this matter (United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, (In re AT&T Wireless), 599 F.Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) and Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment Inc. 342 F.3d 191) the US courts have held that offering an online "preview" is not fair use, and that a public performance royalty is payable.  A reassessment of the purported limits of "fair dealing" may be in order.

Though the issue appears settled in Canada, it continues to be live in the United States (at least one of the aforementioned decisions is currently on appeal). Greg Sandoval wrote a detailed article canvassing the various arguments surrounding whether online previews should be considered fair use, which is well-worth reading.

Copyright and The King

UPDATED BELOW

The good folks at The Lawyers Weekly have published a short article of mine about the reversionary interest under Canadian copyright law.  Wait - it's actually more interesting, and more consequential, than it sounds.

A handful of individuals can count on being called “King” — the next heir to the throne of England, for instance, or Elvis Presley. But for aficionados of comic book art, only one man earns the sobriquet: Jack “the King” Kirby.

Co-creator of fictional legends such as Captain America, the Incredible Hulk and the X-Men, Kirby is also widely regarded as one of the most innovative and influential artists in the history of what is referred to as “sequential art.” Kirby passed away in 1994, but the traditional proclamation, “The king is dead; long live the king!” remains apt: Kirby’s heirs are embroiled in legal proceedings with Marvel Comics, arguing that they are rightfully the sole or joint owners of copyright in various characters created by Kirby. The heirs claim entitlement to a share of profits earned from various derivative works based on those characters, a potentially vast sum—gross revenues from just the North American theatrical release of the three most recent X-Men movies exceed $600 million.

As I noted in the article, Section 14 of the Copyright Act (Canada) provides that, 25 years after an author dies, the copyright in any works which the author created and for which the author was the first owner of copyright (so, basically, excluding works created "in the course of employment") reverts back to the estate of the author.  Jack Kirby's heirs are attempting to claim ownership of various properties created by Kirby by making use of a somewhat similar provision under US copyright law.  The article sets out my critique of the reversionary interest and why I think it is a provision whose continued existence is difficult to defend.

I should also note a brief update on the story hook for the article: Eriq Gardner, writing at THR, Esq., notes that Marvel Comics has won an early round in the ongoing litigation.

UPDATE: One item in the published piece requires correction.  It is incorrect to state that the estate of Joe Shuster has obtained a court ruling granting it a share of copyright in the Superman character beginning in 2013.  Rather, the estate of Joe Shuster, Siegel's partner and Superman co-creator, filed termination notices with the U.S. copyright office in 2003 which, if valid, will allow the estate to recapture Shuster¹s share of the copyright starting in 2013.

US Performance Rights Act and Canadian Neighbouring Rights

Ben Sheffner notes that the Obama Administration, via the Department of Commerce, has expressed its support of the Performance Rights Act (Open Congress has a page dedicated to the House of Representatives version of the bill, HR 848).  According to Sheffner, the bill "has been approved by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and is awaiting floor action in both bodies".  (Ars Technica has a good roundup of competing views.)

As the Department of Commerce's letter indicates, passing the Act would address "a long-standing omission in US copyright law that may have harmed American performers and record companies".  As the law currently stands, when a song is played on an "over the air" radio station, the owners of the publishing in the composition (normally the songwriter(s) and their publishing companies) receive a royalty (the "public performance" royalty) - however, the performer(s) of the song (ie the artist or band) and the owners of the sound recording itself (normally the record company) receives nothing.  (Oddly, under US law, if the song is transmitted by digital means (eg webcasters and satellite stations), a royalty is payable to the performers and sound recording owners.)  Thus, if a band records a cover version of a previously-released song which becomes a hit, the composers of the original song get a royalty, but the band and its record company (whose track is being played) receive nothing for radio broadcasts of the track.

In Canada, the "neighbouring rights" provisions of the Copyright Act, which were enacted in 1997, created a right on the part of performer's and sound recording "makers" to receive "equitable remuneration" for the use of their performances and recordings - meaning the right to collect the type of royalties now being contemplated by the Performance Rights Act (see Sections 15, 18, 19 and 20 of the Canadian Copyright Act).  Re:Sound (previously the Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada), collects and administers the royalties owing to Canadian performers and owners on account of the playing of their tracks. 

How much are these royalties worth?  It's difficult to obtain definitive numbers, but according to the Copyright Board the commercial radio tariff (ie the royalty paid by commercial radio stations on account of their exploitation of neighbouring rights) resulted in $15.9 million worth of royalties being paid to Re:Sound (then the NRCC)  in 2005 (see para. 95 of this February 22, 2008 decision by the Board).  If one were to apply the 10:1 rule of thumb when translating US and Canadian numbers, you're looking at upwards of $150 million per year in royalties.