So You Want Your House to be Famous? Pitfalls of Location Agreements

Tony Wong had an interesting article in last week's Toronto Star, the title of which gives an indication of how a reader is supposed to react to the possibility of having their house used for a film or TV project: "3 days rent for my Maple home? $13,000".  A hefty fee, plus she got to have her picture taken with Whoopi Goldberg.  The same savvy homeowner even managed to get some nice perks built into her contract:

She even took the extra step of stipulating in her contract that her children be part of Good Fences as extras. For a party scene filmed in her dining room, her daughter wore a gold lame dress and her two sons wore tuxedos.

Lucrative payments, brushes with celebrity, bragging rights over having your house immortalized in film - all very enticing, but what should a homeowner think about building into the "location agreement" which they are going to be asked to sign by the producers of the project?  Here is a list of considerations:

  • security deposit - actual cash is always handy to have in hand when something breaks or is otherwise damaged
  • pre- and post-filming inspections - the homeowner and an authorized representative of the producer should conduct inspections of the property, documenting the state of pre-filming conditions and identifying any pre-existing damage so that the possibility of disputes over what was or was not damaged by the film crew is minimized
  • scheduling - homeowners will want to specify the date(s) and time(s) when film crews are entitled to enter onto the premises and do their filming; extra time should come at an extra cost
  • power/utility costs - running klieg lights and providing bathroom facilities for dozens (or hundreds) can add a serious chunk of change to monthly hydro bills - homeowners may want to consider requiring the producer to provide their own source of power generation, portable washroom facilities or otherwise taking responsibility for power costs
  • cleaning - most houses aren't designed or equipped to accommodate the constant stream of personnel which accompany a film shoot - homeowners will want to ensure that cleaning up after themselves is an express obligation of the producer
  • insurance - getting added as an additional insured on the producer's insurance policies should be explored (and homeowners should also check with their own insurance broker to make sure that the commercial activity involved in filming does not somehow void the homeowner's insurance
  • movement of objects - if the filmmakers will be moving objects, or altering structural elements (maybe your kitchen island will block the cameras), removal and restoration should be specifically spelled out in the contract
  • on-screen credit - if it's given, it'll be in tiny print at the end of the credit roll, but it might be worth asking for
  • condo corporation approval - if you live in a condominium, approval from the board of directors may be required (and we can't imagine they, or the property manager, will be thrilled about how many people are going to be trooping through the building's common elements)

There are other issues which can arise depending on the particulars of a film ("what do you mean you're going to be shooting off fireworks in the living room?") - having their lawyer review any location agreement should be a homeowner's priority.

Contracting with Minors - Copyright Implications

Entering into contracts with minors in connection with entertainment-related project can be risky - many jurisdictions legislate particular rules which govern when a contract with a minor will be enforceable against that minor (for previous Signal coverage on the topic, see here), and failure to abide by those rules can imperil the contract.  One area, of particular interest to entertainment lawyers, which has historically been under-analyzed is how child authors are (or should be) treated by copyright law.  Where you're dealing with very young children (say, under the age of 8), the issues become even more acute: to what extent can a child that young meaningfully be said either to have engaged in an act of artistic creation or to have entered into a binding contract?

Julie Cromer Young has written "From the Mouths of Babes: Protecting Child Authors from Themselves" (112 West Virginia Law Review 431 (2010) (hat tip: Media Law Prof Blog), one of the first articles of which I'm aware that explores in detail the interface between copyright, contracts and child authors.  From the abstract:

This article begins by examining the practical ability or inability of the, "infant author," to achieve and exploit the full rights of copyright, given that the Copyright Office itself seems to recognize that any rights given to infant authors are tempered by contract laws. Section II reviews the contractual doctrine of infancy and its effect upon a child author's protection under copyright law. Section III examines the specific problem of minors contracting regarding their copyrights, especially online contracts. Section IV explores the issue as currently framed, reviewing potential solutions already suggested and noting their inherent problems. Section V examines the recent decision in A.V. v. iParadigms, noting potential flaws in the court's rationale. Section VI explores some of these problems, including constitutional rights that support the creative process but which may be limited in a child's setting, and suggests a measure that Congress could take to ensure that these rights are born with the child's work and mature as quickly as rights for a work authored by an adult.

While Young is writing primarily about US law, the issues and analysis should be of interest to entertainment lawyers in all jurisdictions.

Copyright in Jokes - Lawyers Weekly Article

The good folks at the Lawyers Weekly have published a short piece of mine (in their July 1, 2011 issue) which reflects further on the topic of copyright in jokes - the full text of the article can be accessed here, and the opening paragraphs are below:

What is reputedly the world’s shortest joke clocks in at a mere two words: “Pretentious? Moi?”

Though jokes may seem an incongruous (even humorous) subject for intellectual property (IP) law, examining the extent to which protection is available for jokes provides an opportunity to reflect on a variety of issues relevant to copyright reform debates.

Theoretically, there is no reason that a joke cannot be protected by copyright, so long as it meets the generally applicable requirements: the expression must be original and fixed in some tangible medium. For jokes which are delivered only verbally, the lack of fixation will be a barrier to protection. The law generally shies away from according copyright protection to titles and short phrases for fear that a limited monopoly will be asserted over basic elements of expression — and for similar reasons, short jokes would be unlikely to obtain protection.

Previous Signal coverage on the topic of copyright in jokes is collected here.

Question and Answer: Do I Need Permission to Use a Photograph of Public Domain Art?

Let's imagine someone wants to use a photograph of a very old painting in their movie or television show (or, what the heck, in a book) - under Canadian law, do they need permission from the photographer or other owner of the photograph?

I sometimes wonder whether lawyers in other practice areas get questions that can be answered with a simple "yes" or "no".  I envy those lawyers.  Let's say you come across a great photograph of an Old Master (say, the Mona Lisa) or even something more ancient (say, a Roman fresco).  And you want to use that photograph in your movie, TV show or even in a book you're planning on publishing.  The thinking might go like this: the original work of art itself is in the public domain, so how can a photograph of it be subject to copyright?  The argument becomes especially acute if the photograph is simply an exact reproduction of the original work of art (i.e., the photograph simply reproduces the entire work of art, from border to border).

So, what's the answer? Well... it's complicated.

Certainly many museums around the world take the position that they own copyright in the photographs they have arranged to be taken of various pieces of art in their collection.  (See, for example, this photograph of a 1505 painting, on the website of the UK's National Portrait Gallery (the "NPG"), which bears the annotation "© National Portrait Gallery, London"; or this detail of the Mona Lisa from the Louvre, which bears the annotation "© Musée du Louvre / A. Dequier - M. Bard"; or this photograph of a Rubens painting at the Art Gallery of Ontario, which bears the annotation "The Thomson Collection © Art Gallery of Ontario").  As an example, the AGO's website has a Copyright page which states "Reproductive uses are prohibited without the express written authorization of the Art Gallery of Ontario or the copyright owner. ... Any commercial or publication use is strictly prohibited. Copying, redistribution, or exploitation for personal or corporate gain is not permitted."  A few years back, the UK's NPG threatened legal action against a US-resident individual who had download thousands of images from their website (see also coverage by Howard Knopf).  (Unfortunately, I was not able to find any further information about whether there was any final resolution in the NPG matter.)

There certainly doesn't seem to be any obvious reason why a Canadian court would conclude that a photograph of a piece of public domain artwork is not protected by copyright.  Canadian courts have held that photos of everything from the Queen at a press conference (Dobran v Bier, [1959] Que. KB 154] to a photograph of a bed in a sales brochure (Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed Co. v Sleep-King Adjustable Bed Co. (1984), 3 CPR (3d) 81 (BCSC) are photographs protected by copyright.  In the 1930s, the Ontario courts (affirmed by the Privy Council) held that copyright subsisted in photographs of fine art, and that the copyright had been infringed when the photographs were reprinted in a newspaper (Mansell v Star Printing & Publishing Co. of Toronto, [1937] 4 DLR 1).  An old English case (Re Graves (1869), LR 4 QB 715) is usually cited as authority for the proposition that a photograph of a pre-existing artwork is itself protected by copyright, irrespective of the copyright status of the artwork being photographed.

It's a little unclear whether those decisions are incorrect in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's 2004 decision in CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13, wherein the Supreme Court of Canada set out the current meaning of the term "original" in Canadian copyright law (a work needs to be "original" in order to attract copyright protection).  At para. 16, the Court said the following:

For a work to be “original” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, it must be more than a mere copy of another work.  At the same time, it need not be creative, in the sense of being novel or unique.  What is required to attract copyright protection in the expression of an idea is an exercise of skill and judgment.  By skill, I mean the use of one’s knowledge, developed aptitude or practised ability in producing the work.  By judgment, I mean the use of one’s capacity for discernment or ability to form an opinion or evaluation by comparing different possible options in producing the work. This exercise of skill and judgment will necessarily involve intellectual effort. The exercise of skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so trivial that it could be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise.  For example, any skill and judgment that might be involved in simply changing the font of a work to produce “another” work would be too trivial to merit copyright protection as an “original” work.

That formulation of originality is tough to apply when we're talking about photographs of fine art.  On the one hand, a photograph of fine art is arguably just a "mere copy" of another work - indeed, short of a photocopy produced by a photocopier or a downloaded file, it's difficult to envision something which is more of a "copy" than a photograph of fine art - since the whole point of a photograph of fine art is to be an exact reproduction of the artwork in question.  However (you knew that was coming, right?), the Court goes on to say "[w]hat is required to attract copyright protection in the expression of an idea is an exercise of skill and judgment.  By skill, I mean the use of one’s knowledge, developed aptitude or practised ability in producing the work".  Whatever else someone wants to say about the photography of fine art of the calibre necessary for use on a museum website, it certainly requires the "exercise of skill and judgment" and the use of "knowledge, developed aptitude or practised ability" - these are professional photographers who are hired to create the photographs (by comparison, feel free to request a copy of my various out of focus, off-kilter, lopsided attempts to photograph artwork in various musuems).  The professional photographers hired to create the photographs in question definitely make use of their "capacity for discernment or ability to form an opinion or evaluation by comparing different possible options" when creating the photographs - issues ranging from lighting to distance to filters to lenses come in to play in making the decision of how to photograph artwork.   And Canadian courts certainly have not been shy about finding that a "work" has copyright protection when an "author" has expended time and effort in creating it - on my reading, it appears often that Canadian courts are more than willing to protect "effort", and certainly don't require that there be much "creativity".

Not everyone agrees, however, with the notion that photographs of fine art can be protected by copyright.  In Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (SDNY 1999), a US district court, applying both English and US copyright law, held that photos of public domain artwork were not capable of being protected by copyright law as they lacked the requisite "originality" - with respect to English law, the court examined a number of English cases and commentators and concluded that the Re Graves decision was no longer good law in light of subsequent evolution of the notion of "originality".  Having read the district court's reasoning, I'm not entirely convinced they got that correct - it seems that a number of the authorities they cited argue at least as strongly for finding copyright in a photograph of fine art as they argue against it.

So... where does that leave us?  It appears that under US law a photo of public domain fine art is not susceptible of being protected by copyright (maybe - the decision in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), which was not mentioned by the Bridgeman decision, seems to go the other way).  Under Canadian and English law, the matter seems, at best, uncertain, with gusts towards "protected by copyright law".  For more detailed consideration of the matter under English law (with particular reference to the National Portrait Gallery matter mentioned above) see Francis DaveyAndreas Guadamuz-Gonzalez and Simon Bradshaw.  The fact that the underlying work is in the public domain probably won't have any impact on the analysis: translations of public domain literary are protected by copyright, as are new arrangements of public domain musical works.

So, if a producer or publisher came to me and asked whether they needed permission to reproduce a photograph of a piece of art in the public domain, assuming that the photograph itself was not so old that it was itself in the public domain, I'd be inclined to say that such permission was required.  It's possible that they'd have a plausible "fair dealing" argument, but that requires an analysis even more contorted and contingent than the one set out in this post for the question of whether copyright exists at all in the photograph.  Ultimately, the producer's/publisher's choice would come down to this: what's going to be cheaper - trying to get permission to reproduce the photograph upfront, or defending a copyright infringement claim if everything goes wrong?

It's Alive (Part 2): Heenan Blaikie's Workplacewire.ca is up and running

Entertainment and Media Law Signal would like to welcome Workplacewire.ca, the latest Heenan Blaikie blog. This one is dedicated to providing the latest legal developments from the Labour, Employment and Pension group.

 

Workplace Wire connects employers to the latest developments in Ontario and Federal workplace law.

The blog offers readers:

  • Updates on all facets of labour, employment and pension law in a client-focused approach
  • Regular legislative updates, legal commentary and practical resources
  • Insightful commentary that will interest both public (municipal, provincial and federal levels of government) and privately-owned companies and institutions; school boards and the healthcare sector
  • The latest developments on progressive practices in areas such as pay equity, human rights, workers' compensation and health and safety

 Welcome aboard!

The "Pay or Play" Clause in Film and TV Contracts

I was speaking at a conference earlier this week when the discussion turned to the issue of "pay or play" (sometimes rendered "pay-or-play") clauses in film- and TV-related contracts, particularly contracts entered into by actors or other participants in the creative process (such as directors).  While everyone on the panel seemed fairly comfortable that "pay or play" has a relatively settled meaning in the film and TV industries, I thought it might be useful to review some definitions of the term which had been proposed by others.

First up, Wikipedia has a surprisingly detailed entry on the topic which includes multiple examples (under the heading "Guarantee (filmmaking)").  According to Wikipedia, "pay-or-play" is an "informal" term referring to "a term of an actor or director's contract that guarantees remuneration if, through no fault of their own, the artist is released from the contract".  That seems to be broadly consistent with what many people in the industry might use, though it is a bit imprecise from a legal standpoint: I'm a little troubled by the notion that it is a "guarantee" and that the payment obligation is binding so long as "through no fault of their own" an artist is "released from the contract".  A "guarantee" is actually a legal obligation imposed on a third party to perform contractual obligations if the party whose performance is being guaranteed fails to perform; I can't meaningfully guarantee my own obligations, only someone else can.  A contract can have both a pay-or-play clause and be guaranteed - but a pay-or-play clause isn't itself a guarantee.  The phrase "through no fault of their own" seems a little too narrow (i.e., if I'm acting for the producer I think there are other situations in which the artist should not be paid, even if they are pay-or-play) and "released from the contract" also seems too narrow (i.e., if I'm acting for the performer, the payment obligation should be triggered even in situations where the performer is not technically "released" from the contract).

Matt Galsor at Law Law Land wrote Q&A: So...What Exactly Is "Pay or Play?", which seems like a promising source of information - and indeed the promise is fulfilled, but so well that the post is difficult to summarize.  Here's an attempt: the notion of a pay-or-play obligation is impossible to understand without first appreciating that the obligation of a producer under a performer's contract will often be subject to certain conditions precedent being met (for example: the producer being able to obtain sufficient financing for the project; the performer proving that they are legally able to work (by proving citizenship or holding a visa, for example); other performers being available for the project, etc.).  But performers don't want their deals (and their entitlement to payment) to be subject to conditions - they want their money whatever happens.  Hence, the demand that they be made "pay or play" - which translates, as Matt writes, into

"when everyone wants to be pay or play, what they really mean or should mean is that they want no conditions to their deal so that the money will be owed whether or not the movie actually happens"

That's a bit more nuanced than the Wikipedia entry, and raises a concern: people, even individuals who have extensive industry experience, seem to be using a three word phrase to describe a concept which is pretty darn complicated (Matt spent more than 700 words explaining it).  Language "shortcuts" like that tend to (or should) give lawyers the willies.  People are using the phrase to mean something, but it's not always entirely clear that everybody means the same thing.  Our next source seems to indicate that the "pay or play" concept is fairly slippery, and that what at first seemed to be a pretty open-and-shut entails a fairly involved analysis.  Do the words "pay or play" in a contract mean that the money is owed irrespective of whether the movie is made or not?  It might - particularly if the phrase "pay or play" is not qualified or modified by any other language - but then again, it might not.

John Yudelson has written a pair of informative articles which also happen to shed some light on what "pay or play" means: "Hot bodies or cool heads?: actors versus producers in feature film deals" and "The impact of actors and producers in studio-financed movie deals".  In "Hot bodies..." Yudelson describes a pay-or-play deal as one "under which the studio is obliged to pay their full fee irrespective of whether a film is produced or not, depending on certain contingencies".  That starts to sounds interesting: what are the "certain contingencies"?  It's beginning to seem like "pay or play" is not so much a binary switch (i.e., once a deal is "pay or play" the producer is obliged to make payment come hell or high water) but instead is an obligation based on the obtaining of a number of different states of affairs.

Tony Duarte's masterful Canadian Film & Television Business & Legal Practice offers some further insight into the matter.  In section 9:50.70(c), Tony states that a "pay-or-play" agreement is one in which the performer's "compensation is earned in full under any and all circumstances other than the performer's own default and, in some cases, force majeure" [emphasis added].  Now we're getting somewhere.

Duarte goes on in the notes to his Form 8 to say that "pay or play contracts allow the production company to terminate services for any reason provided that the entire fee expected by the contractor for the engagement is paid to the contractor in full ... such guarantees are generally drafted to make clear that certain named events of force majeure may excuse the production company from performing the contract or that the contract is terminated and no payment made in the event of the contractor's death or defined events of disability or default" [again, emphasis added].  Excellent - more details.

Before going further, we should also note that Duarte's comments add an important element to the analysis: "pay or play" status can be beneficial for the producer as well as the talent, since it means that the producer is able to terminate a performer for any reason whatsoever, so long as the fee is paid - that can come in handy if an actor is disruptive or even if for purely creative or personal relationship reasons the engagement simply isn't productive.

Adding together the foregoing, we can see that simply using the phrase "pay or play" in a contract, without anything further, could be a recipe for confusion: on its own, the phrase can mean anything from "payment is owed no matter what" (favourable to the performer) to "payment is owed in certain circumstances" (favourable to the producer).  Because of the variation in understandings of the "meaning" of the term "pay or play", resort to contractual language will be important in the event of a dispute.  As usual, precision in drafting is required.   If acting as producer's counsel, I suggest that a pay or play clause should be made expressly subject to the following:

  • termination of the performer "for cause" (such as default)
  • termination of the performer as a result of death or disability
  • the occurrence of an event of force majeure (or at least certain events of force majeure)
  • the performer's signing of documents which contain at least a grant of rights in favour of the producer
  • the performer qualifying for insurance coverage
  • the performer qualifying for any necessary immigration or job eligibility conditions (for example, if the film is being shot in Canada (or any other country), and the performer is not eligible to enter Canada because of an undisclosed prior criminal conviction, why should the performer enjoy a windfall payment?)

The film and TV industries are industries replete with their own terms of art - only in limited circumstances should trade "understandings" of those terms of art be relied on.

CRTC Chairman's Speech at Banff World Media Festival

Konrad von Finckenstein, Chairman of the CRTC (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission) delivered a speech on Monday at the Banff World Media Festival, the full text of which is available here.

The content of the speech is notable for a number of reasons, not least the broad-ranging assessment (prediction?) of how Canada's media regulatory regime should (will?) be modified:

We are in a new digital world now, a world in which consumers are in control. They have access to a wide range of digital platforms and applications. These new media bypass the traditional pathways of regulated broadcasting: over-the-air, cable and satellite. Therefore the Commission's ability to regulate through control of access is very much reduced.

I believe we need a conceptual rethink of the whole regulatory system. The results of that rethink should preferably be embodied in a single comprehensive Act to govern all communications.

The aim of the new legislation would be to create a structure for optimal regulation of the transportation of bits, whether by wireline or wireless technology, and whether they are carrying voice, video or data. This structure would support the development of a flexible, competitive and innovative system providing access for all Canadians to their choice of fast and efficient digital resources.

Here are some of the key points that might be included:

  • A statement of objectives for the system—economic, social and cultural.

  • A clear distinction between the broad policy choices to be made by the government and the powers to be assigned to an independent regulator in all areas of communication, including broadcasting, telecom and spectrum management.

  • Specific provisions on timelines and on regulatory tools, such as AMPs (Administrative Monetary Penalties), mandatory adoption of codes, and the power to impose arbitration.

  • A coherent scheme for the support of Canadian content. This could include subsidies, or incentives in the form of regulatory exemptions and exceptions, or a mix of all of these methods.

  • The responsibilities and governance of the public broadcaster, defining its special role in reflecting Canada's unique culture and values.

Tags:

The Regulation of Talent Agents in Canada

Ricardo Cestero over at Law Law Land remarks on the inherent tensions in the relationship between talent and talent agents (Agents vs. Talent: Money For Nothing?) - Ricardo's post prompted this quick review of the regulation of Canadian talent agents.  (This post will ignore general laws and regulations which are generally applicable to business activity.)

Only the Province of British Columbia expressly regulates the activities of talent agents.  The British Columbia Ministry of Labour offers information on their website about the relevant provincial regulations and maintains a list of licensed talent agencies.  As the Ministry website notes, the basic elements of the BC regulatory regime are as follows:

  • Talent agents in B.C. must be licensed by the Director of Employment;
  • Talent agencies fees may not be more than 15 percent of wages;
  • Photo fees (up to $25 annually) may only be deducted from actual earnings;
  • No other fees may be charged by a talent agency.

As the FAQ on the site notes, any talent agency who is "recruiting talent in British Columbia" is required to be licensed by the BC Ministry of Labour.  For purposes of the regulation, the following definitions apply: 

"Talent agency" means a person or company who, for a fee, engages in the occupation of offering to procure, promising to procure, attempting to procure or procuring employment for actors, performers, extras or technical creative film persons.

"Technical creative film person" includes film directors, directors of photography, production designers, art directors, persons involved in writing or rewriting scripts, hair stylists, make-up artists, costume designers, or animal coordinators involved in the production of a film, video, television show or television commercial.

Sections 38 and 38.1 of the Regulation to the BC Employment Standards Act set out the details of the relevant regulatory scheme, including details about records which must be kept, how quickly payments must be remitted to talent after being received by the agent, and a prohibition on "payola" payments (ie payments made "to a person for obtaining or assisting in obtaining employment for someone").

In addition to government regulation, the talent agency industry has formed a number of associations in an effort at self-regulation.  The EICAA (Entertainment Industry Coalition Agency Association) has crafted a Code of Ethical Conduct for Talent and Background Agents.  Other associations include TAMAC (Talent Agents and Managers Association of Canada) and AMIS (Acting and Modelling Information Service).

Settlement Approved in Canadian Music Industry "Pending Lists" Lawsuit

On May 30, 2011, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved the settlement agreements reached among the four major Canadian record labels, CMRRA and SODRAC (click here for previous Signal coverage of the topic).  As reported by Christine Dobby in the Legal Post:

But, in what was described in court as a contentious and heated process that included eight court-assisted mediation meetings and numerous case management appearances, the parties reached an agreement that includes the financial settlement as well as a process for dealing with future use of unlicenced work.

“The result overall is approximately $50.2-million in settlement benefits to the class,” Mr. Foreman said. “I believe it’s a strong financial resolution to the case.”

Harrison Pensa, who acted as counsel to the plaintiffs in the matter, have updated their website to include the Court approved Notice of Certification and Settlement Approval. Of particular interest is the requirement for the creation of "a revised Canadian mechanical licensing platform", to be implemented by January 1, 2013, and which will include a publicly accessible website to "allow for public review and submission of ownership claims of unidentified Musical Works".  So not only will crowd-sourcing become part of the process, but works which remain unidentified will be made the subject of a license application by CSI (CMRRA-SODRAC Inc.) to the Copyright Board under the unlocatable copyright owners regime - and royalties paid in respect of those works will be held in trust pending eventual identification.  The new mechanism seems to be an innovative and productive solution to the challenge of unidentified owners.

Question and Answer: Do I Need Permission to Film the Outside of a Building?

The Copyright Act (Canada) extends copyright protection to "architectural works" (a subset of "artistic works") - does a filmmaker need permission to film the exterior of a building in a film or TV project?

Probably not, at least with respect to the building itself - but as with most matters which involve legal analysis, the answer is probably better phrased as "it depends".  Let's start with some basic principles: Yes, buildings, as architectural works, can be protected by copyright.  Some buildings will be in the public domain (because their author passed away more than fifty years ago, causing the building to have passed beyond the limits of the term of copyright protection in Canada, being life of the author plus fifty years), and so no claim of copyright infringement could plausibly be brought, and so no permission would be required.

If we're talking about buildings which are still under copyright protection, of particular use for filmmakers is Section 32.2(1)(b)(i) of the Copyright Act (Canada), which identifies certain "permitted acts" - the section states the following:

It is not an infringement of copyright ... for any person to reproduce, in a painting, drawing, engraving, photograph or cinematographic work (i) an architectural work, provided the copy is not in the nature of an architectural drawing or plan;

In short: filming a building for use in a film or TV project (each of which would qualify as a "cinematographic work") does not constitute copyright infringement of the copyright in that building.  However, things are rarely quite that simple.  The clearance procedures of most film and TV errors and omissions insurance policies will require that clearance be obtained if the filmed footage will include elements which are separately copyrightable or trade-marked.  Thus, consideration must also be given to any items which are attached to the building in question - such as signs containing business names or logos, or artwork (such as an advertisement consisting of a large poster).  

It's also worth considering whether artistic works which are part of the building itself require a separate clearance (imagine a statute or gargoyle which is attached to a building, or a mosaic or frieze which add decorative elements); while there do not appear to be any Canadian cases on point, there is a US 9th Circuit decision which discusses the matter in the context of a film project (in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000) the court concluded that towers attached to a building shown in the film Batman Forever did not require separate clearance, as they fell within the ambit of 17 U.S.C. § 120(a), the US analogue to the Canadian provision we're discussing).

Other non-copyright matters which require consideration include the need to obtain permissions for the location of cameras and lighting which may be required in order to obtain the desired footage (i.e., if you need to get onto private or municipal property in order to set up your shot, permission will be required), and any potential defamation concerns (it's not terribly difficult to, imagine a scene showing the exterior of a building and attributing nefarious activities to the residents of that building - which, if the building and its tenants are readily identifiable, could give rise to a claim).

Thus, what at first appears to be a fairly simple question to answer refracts into a fairly nuanced analysis which could require some timely legal analysis by producer's counsel.  In closing, I should also note that I while researching this post I came across my favourite German word for today: Panoramafreiheit, a German legal concept (which apparently translates as "Freedom of Panorama") which appears roughly analogous to the exception to Canadian copyright discussed in this post. 

[Inspiration for this post was provided by Dear Rich: Does travel photographer need property release?, Dear Rich: Do you need permission to publish pictures of buildings? and by Gordan P. Firemark's Asked and Answered: Using public buildings as setting for a film.]

In My Other Life, I'm a Superhero - Lawyers in Comic Books

One of the more charming aspects of practicing entertainment law is that the entertainment bar generally tends not to take itself too seriously.  In that vein, I offer William A. Hilyerd's "Hi Superman, I'm a Lawyer: A Guide to Attorneys (and Other Legal Professionals) Portrayed in American Comic Books" 15 Widener Law Review 159 (2009).  An exhaustively researched (300 footnotes(!)) and entertaining read, Hilyerd's article provides not just an nice overview of comic book history, but an intriguing analysis of how the portrayal of lawyers in comic books has changed over time. (hat tip: University of Alberta Faculty of Law Faculty Blog)

Jones v Corbis - Walking Down a Red Carpet and Implied Consent to Uses of Images

When a celebrity (or anyone else) walks down a red carpet, what are they consenting to in terms of the use of their image?  That issue was recently considered in the US district court decision Shirley Jones v Corbis Corporation (Case No 10-8668 SVW (CW)) (hat tip: THR, Esq.) - the decision is noteworthy because, while the layperson's response (or even a prima facie legal response) might be simple ("she's walking down a red carpet - of course she consented to the use of her photograph!") the District Court's reasons illustrate just how narrowly construed legal conclusions can be.

The facts of the case are relatively simple: Shirley Jones (perhaps best known for her role on the 1970s TV show The Partridge Family asserted that Corbis had violated her rights of publicity by displaying "sample" photographs of Jones on their website; Corbis, a stock photo company, maintains multiple websites via which potential customers can search Corbis' library for photographs.  If a user types a term into the search function, low-quality "sample" photographs matching the searched terms will appear.  Corbis often does not own copyright in the photographs, but instead has entered into license agreements with the copyright owners, and in turn offers licenses in the photographs to Corbis' customers. In the case of Jones, when someone typed in "Shirley Jones" a series of sample photos would appear, indicating the inventory of relevant photographs that Corbis had available; some of those photos were of Jones at various "red carpet" events.  Jones asserted that her right of publicity was being infringed by the act of showing those sample photographs.

The District Court rejected Jones' claim.  The court noted that "celebrities who walk down the red carpet generally pose for photographers and respond to their requests to smile, or to look in their direction"; at some red carpet events, notices are posted "stating that the celebrities entering the red carpet consent to being photographed and recorded, and also to having their name or likeness used in connection with the event".  It was undisputed that Jones had consented to the taking of the photographs.  Indeed, Jones even acknowledged that the photographers who took the photos would be selling those photos and would need to show those photos to prospective buyers in order to secure sales of them (in days of yore, photographers would carry around books with copies of the photographs).  The court further noted that "it is custom and practice in the entertainment industry that red carpet photographs are widely used and disseminated".  At this point, it is worth noting just how finely-crafted is the "implied consent" that Jones was deemed to have given: she did not sign any documents granting consent, nor did she even verbally agree to certain uses - instead, the parameters of her consent (taking the photograph, selling the photograph, offering samples of the photograph to prospective buyers) were all implied from her actions and the context in which those actions took place.

As the court described it, Jones' "only argument" could be that "she did not consent to [Corbis'] placement of sample images on its websites for the purpose of soliciting customers".  But such an argument had no cogency: she knew the photographers would be selling their photos, and that they would need to show the photos to others; the fact that the photographers had, in turn, authorized Corbis to show the photos in order to facilitate sales was entirely consistent with the scope of the consent Jones had given - she therefore had no claim against Corbis.  Her follow-up argument that her consent was limited to allow only the individuals photographers to show the photographs was completely unsupported by any evidence.

Again, though, what is remarkable about the decision is how narrow it is - in closing its reasoning, the court expressly states that its holding is "limited to the fact that Plaintiff consented to the display of her likeness for the purpose of distributing the images themselves ... [the] reasoning does not address whether Plaintiff's consent encompasses any other type of display" [emphasis added]; in particular, "the Court's holding leaves Plaintiff's rights of publicity undisturbed in cases where a defendant uses Plaintiff's image to advertise an unrelated product ... or if a defendant transforms Plaintiff's image into a separate product".

Because the court found for the defendant on the issue of consent, the court did not need to consider the defendant's other arguments (that there was First Amendment protection or that the claim was pre-empted by the Copyright Act).

Tattoos On Screen Redux

About a year ago, we posted about Tattoos On Screen, offering a brief overview about the errors and omissions clearance issues posed by reproducing tattoos inked on actors bodies in film and TV projects.  Our early adopter status didn't much help, though: little did we know that, during the recent, er, period of repose that this blog experienced, there would be a major news story talking about, what else, tattoos on screen and that we wouldn't have time to weigh in on the matter.  Rather than do a poor job of attempting to rehash what others have already written about the topic, we offer a selection of some of the best pieces from the legal blogosphere over the last few weeks about The Hangover Part II and the replication of Mike Tyson's facial tattoo: